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This submission makes some brief comments on the Water Property Rights Discussion 
Paper. We do this from a very particular perspective, as researchers at the Australian 
National University’s Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research (CAEPR) in 
Canberra. Since its establishment in 1990, CAEPR has undertaken considerable research 
on Indigenous economic development and policy issues. A proportion of CAEPR’s 
research corpus has focused on the issue of Indigenous property rights in resources, 
usually associated with rights embedded in land rights law and more recently, since 1993, 
in native title law. 
 
The Water Property Rights Discussion Paper outlines a set of common rules for fresh 
water entitlements and allocation to ensure a greater efficiency in use. We concur with 
the general principles laid out in the Discussion Paper that look to ensure a more 
sustainable use of water, in the broad sense of ecological, economic and social 
sustainability. We also concur with the focus on equity, both between users today and 
inter-generationally. It is recognised that the Discussion Paper is dealing principally, at 
this stage, with theoretical issues seeking to establish a water property rights framework 
that would be acceptable Australia-wide. The Discussion Paper does not deal with 
particular groups within Australian society who may have special interests in water. 
 
Nonetheless, it seems important, even at this early juncture, to make some mention of one 
special interest group—Indigenous Australians. We do this for four broad reasons: 
 
1. The water property rights framework that is being advocated is predicated on three 
important elements: security of tenure, transferability and clarity of specification. 
Arguably, these are all areas where there is enormous uncertainty from the 
Indigenous perspective, with regard to their water property rights interests in the 
native title era. 
 
2. It can be argued that the depressed economic status of Indigenous people in Australia 
today is explicable, at least in part, by the alienation of their ancestors’ property rights 
in land and in resources. Also, historically, water rights have not been regarded as 
property in the same way as land and resources. A case can be made for ensuring that 
Indigenous interests in any property rights that are to be newly-created should be 
acknowledged, and a portion reserved (hypothecated) for Indigenous interests , to 
avoid mistakes of the past. 
 
3. The very extent of the Indigenous estate in Australia—somewhere between 15 and 20 
per cent of the continent (Pollack 2001) including substantial water catchment areas 
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and in some jurisdictions far more (e.g. 42% of the Northern Territory rising 
potentially to 52%, and over 80% of the NT coastline)—suggests that the actual or 
potential property rights in fresh water of this group cannot be ignored. All too often 
the alienation referred to above has occurred because an Indigenous voice has not 
been heard in newly-emerging debates about efficient and equitable allocation of 
property rights. 
 
4. While recent case law has clarified a number of important issues in relation to the 
legal institution of native title, considerable uncertainty remains regarding potential 
native title rights and interests in fresh water. Such rights and interests may extend 
beyond the Indigenous estate, for example in situations where the quality of fresh 
water that flows on Indigenous land is impaired on other lands. Such uncertainty in 
itself generates transactions costs. 
 
It seems uncontestable that at present Indigenous interests, practices, and uses in, or 
associated with, different waters have not been acknowledged in the current water reform 
agenda. These interests are extremely diverse across the Australian continent and 
probably always were. Nevertheless they need to be considered, understood, valued and 
integrated into any emerging water property rights framework. For future water resource 
markets to function efficiently and equitably Indigenous property rights in water will 
need to be recognised and any particularities—some created by western laws, some by 
the articulation between western and customary laws—accommodated. Without such 
accommodation, we would argue, uncertainties and inefficiencies in any new water 
market will be created, with potentially high transactions costs and large compensation 
expenses. 
 
The Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) (NTA) is the key statute that generates some potential 
ambiguity for the clear definition of property rights in water. Since the 1992 decision by 
the High Court of Australia in the Mabo case, which recognised the existence of native 
title as part of the common law of Australia, there has been growing impetus for the 
definition, recognition and protection of Indigenous rights in both onshore and offshore 
waters. The NTA provides for the possibility of native title rights in the sea, at the same 
time confirming government ownership of water and minerals, while guaranteeing native 
title rights to customary use of resources, rights that are often dependent on inland water. 
In such situations possession can be differentiated from use rights. For example, the 
floodplain wetlands that are often grossly affected by allocation of water to other 
purposes are critical to the customary economies of many Aboriginal groups. 
 
Section 24 of the NTA validates so called ‘future acts’ carried out by governments 
relating to the management of inland waters after 1 July 1993 and to other management 
regimes after 1 January 1994. The NTA provides for the validation of other acts by each 
State/Territory and would apply to the issue of permits and licences. This provision 
recognises that native title rights can be extinguished or suspended to the extent that they 
are inconsistent with another right. However, in accord with the Australian constitution, 
compensation is payable by the State under ss.24HA(5) and 24HA(6) for either 
extinguishment or diminution through the grant or issue of an inconsistent right. The 
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implications of this on water management plans may differ between States given their 
different statutory bases for determining, issuing and regulating water rights and interests. 
 
Two States, NSW and Queensland, have objectives in their water statutes that recognise 
the rights and interests of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples. The NSW Water 
Management Act 2000 is most comprehensive. The definitions in this Act define native 
title rights in a limited sense to mean ‘the right to take and use water for domestic, 
personal and non-commercial communal purposes’. Regulations prescribe the maximum 
amounts of water that can be taken and used for such purposes in any one year. McKay 
(2002) suggests that the recent High Court decision in State of WA v Ward supports the 
proposition that the new Water Acts do not extinguish or limit customary native title 
rights to hunt, fish, gather and participate in cultural and spiritual activities. Again, use 
rights can be distinguished from rights of possession.  
 
To provide a  better explication of the possible implications of this statutory framework, 
based on economic principles, some recent research at CAEPR has used the concept 
‘hybridity’ to analyse the inter-cultural nature of the economy on much of the Indigenous 
estate (Altman 2001). The hybrid economy, while highly variable, can be conceptualised 
as consisting of three sectors: the customary, the market and the state. The NTA 
recognises and protects extant Indigenous native title rights in the customary sector. How 
customary elements of the hybrid economy will interact with a wider commercial water 
market will need careful consideration. If the articulation between customary and 
commercial rights are overlooked, two potentially negative outcomes are possible. First, 
there will be no incentive for customary use to be efficient. Potential efficiency losses 
here may be small scale compared to commercial use, but may nevertheless be of 
strategic value especially in upstream water catchment areas. Secondly, and more 
significantly, if commercial use impairs customary use, then there are legal avenues of 
recourse for native title interests. Such scenarios are most likely where property rights 
and legal regimes are most contested, that is where Indigenous land and sea rights are 
already exercised and where there are legally recognised native title parties. When non-
market (customary) interests in water are taken into account there are problems in the 
clarity of definition of rights in water. 
 
An associated issue that might hamper a clear definition of property rights is that while 
the COAG framework focuses on private rights and use of water, native title is a 
communal (or group) right. Davies (2001) discusses this issue in the context of natural 
resource management more broadly. Native title holders have no legal option other than 
to hold and manage native title communally. This is because native title is defined by 
common and statute law as a system of collective rights. By negotiated agreement, native 
title holders may choose to relinquish their native title to the crown. It is also possible to 
relinquish native title in favour of allocation of individual property rights to group 
members. However, if they continue as native title holders, native title interests must 
operate collectively as the title itself is inalienable and indivisible (Mantziaris and Martin 
2000). This has clear implications for potential trade in any newly-established water 
markets. 
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The NTA framework has a set of procedures that are designed to ensure that native title 
interests are not unfairly treated. These vary somewhat between past and future acts and 
between valid and invalid actions. There are also alternative dispute resolution 
mechanisms within the NTA framework that encourage agreement making. 
 
As already noted, the NTA does not confer full property rights in fresh water to native 
title parties. The property right is only partial, covering customary use rights. In so far as 
future developments might affect native title interests there is requirement that native title 
holders or claimants are notified and have a right to comment on such proposals. Not to 
go through such due process runs the risk of invalidity. This so-called right to negotiate 
(RTN) is a limited right, but if extinguishment or impairment of native title rights are a 
possibility then there is a basis for either seeking compensation or for brokering 
agreements that can be registered. There is an emerging view that negotiating agreements 
is less costly and preferable to litigation. Indigenous Land Use Agreements (ILUAs) are 
voluntary agreements between a native title group and other stakeholders abut the use and 
management of land—Neate (1999) has referred to them as a risk management tool for 
Indigenous Australians. ILUAs that encompass water rights could establish a similar 
agreement process for the use and management of fresh water. 
 
Native title holders whose status has been so determined and whose rights have been 
affected by past acts are entitled to compensation under the NTA. This compensation is 
payable either by the Commonwealth alone or with the States/Territories jointly, but not 
by any third party who acquired an interest as a result of a past act. With respect to land, 
compensation is provided on the basis of ‘just terms’ and to date has been capped at the 
equivalent value of a freehold estate. The operations of just terms is unclear in relation to 
water rights and markets. It is important to note that under the NTA framework, native 
title rights can be extinguished or impaired by other legislation, but such extinguishment 
or impairment must be compensated. Legislation which does not provide for such 
recognition and compensation may be invalid, at least in part, or challengeable in the 
court.  
 
The current uncertainty about the workings of the future acts and of past acts 
compensation regimes under the NTA framework also generates uncertainty about how 
new water property rights and markets might be created unencumbered (or undistorted) 
by a wide range of native title interests. Under such circumstances, it would be remiss of 
us if we did not make some suggestions to the Water CEOs Group for addressing the 
issues that we have outlined above. The following possibilities are canvassed: 
 
• COAG should consider acknowledging and explicitly recognising the potential 
impact of native title on water property rights. This could include the development of 
a national approach, including the use of standardised terminology, to recognising 
native title rights in water. 
• COAG should support the development of a communications and public education 
strategy that explains the nature of native title rights in water. In particular, there is a 
need to investigate appropriate means to enhance the capacity of Indigenous 
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stakeholders to engage more effectively with the emerging water market and trading 
framework. 
• COAG should consider the value of initiating research case studies that assess the 
impacts of current water policies and frameworks on native title water rights, and that 
explore the potential for negotiation of local and regional water use agreements that 
parallel the ILUA framework. 
• COAG should facilitate equitable Indigenous representation on government and 
industry bodies involved in water management. This should be regarded as a two-way 
process. A better understanding of the effects of any new property rights in water on 
indigenous interests can be gained through taking Indigenous knowledge into 
account, and Indigenous representation could also ensure greater direct dissemination 
of information to the Indigenous community about reform proposals and their 
potential benefits and costs. 
 
In conclusion, this submission argues that COAG cannot create an efficient water market 
if the new property rights framework focuses only on commercial and private utilisation 
of water. There is another set of users that now has customary rights to water recognised 
in law. Our overarching argument is that Indigenous interests in water, now recognised in 
the native title statutory framework and emerging case law, must be accommodated from 
the outset. To establish an efficient water market requires not only the recognition of 
customary rights in water, but also some consideration of innovative approaches that 
might accord such rights commercial (or quasi-commercial) status to encourage efficient 
use and possible trade. To ignore such interests would run the risk of generating high 
future transactions costs, because legal debate would follow, inevitably, about the relative 
merits of commercial and customary rights and the possible impairment of native title 
rights; and/or potential for expensive compensation if native title rights are improperly 
impaired or extinguished.  
 
Indigenous stakeholders should be considered from the outset in any proposal for the 
creation of new property rights in water—their diverse rights, interests, values and 
activities should be recognised and incorporated into water management planning. 
Ignoring Indigenous stakeholders runs the risk, alluded to at the outset, of further 
alienating an already disadvantaged group from rights in valuable resources. As 
significant land and coastline owners, Indigenous interests have statutory procedural 
rights to protect their native title. The continual triggering of the assertion of such rights 
through creation of an insufficiently inclusive definition of water property could entrench 
from the outset avoidable inequities and consequent inefficiencies in a new water 
property rights framework. 
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